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THE AUTHORITY OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
TO DECIDE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES:
RICHARDSON V. TENNESSEE BOARD OF
DENTISTRY
Marykay Foy*
The tradition preventing administrative agencies from deciding
any constitutional issue is changing.' Since the birth of the
administrative agency, administrative law judges, courts and legislators
have functioned under an assumption that administrative agencies
cannot consider constitutional challenges. Richardson v. Board of
Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446 (Tenn. 1995) is an example of how this
assumption has recently been challenged. In an opinion by Justice
Penny J. White, the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized that
administrative law judges can resolve some types of constitutional
challenges.
Richardson categorized challenges which an ALJ may face:
facial challenges, "as-applied" challenges, and challenges to the
agency's rules or procedures. Richardson delineated the authority of
an agency to resolve constitutional challenges in each category.
Richardson provides clear guidelines and explicitly gives agencies
increased authority to address some constitutional challenges.
The traditional approach does not rest on an explicit
constitutional command but can be traced to implications of the
separation of powers doctrine, to theories of checks and balances and
the broad authority given courts.? These interpretations are fueled by
apprehensions that special interest groups might use agency powers to
further their own goals, suspicions of the administrative agencies'
Third year law student, Loyola University Chicago, School of Law.
'Recent cases from a variety of states (discussed infra) have challenged this
prohibition, affecting the relationship between administrative agencies and Article III courts.
In evaluating the philosophical and constitutional foundations of the administrative process's
interaction with Article III Courts, Professor Davis notes that "[even the Supreme Court]
continues to struggle in its efforts to resolve basic definitional disputes that determine the
permissible institutional structure of government [within the separation of powers doctrine]."

2 KENNETH CULP

DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE JR., ADMDNSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE

4 (Supp. 1995).
2
See Note,

§ 2.4 at

The Authority of Administrative Agencies to Consider the
Constitutionalityof Statutes, 90 HARv. L.REV. 1682, 1706 (1977).
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competence in adjudicating such claims, and general mistrust of
government.3
Mistrust of agency power may reflect the broad scope of agency
authority. Administrative agencies can increase your taxes;4 restrict
your business,5 take your land,6 terminate your employment,7 force you
to take drugs," or prohibit you from writing movie reviews in your
school newspaper.'
Richardson acknowledged an agency's authority to address
constitutional issues and offers clear guidelines on when and how this
3

Interest group theories on administrative discretion propose a view that
administrative agencies operate as a product of the political process, with the accompanying
anxieties of politicians catering to special interest groups. This view fuels the suspicion that
ALJ's decisions are political rather than reasonable, just and impartial. See Daniel B.
Rodriguez, The Positive PoliticalDimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 Wash. U.L.Q. 1, 24
(1994).
Professor Krauss, in commenting that the Supreme Court's current policy of judicial
restraint has left the power of the administrative agency unchecked and unaccountable without
the adequate safeguards of 'legal' justice notes that "[the American people have been led to
believe that they have been oppressed by a government that is too large and too expensive.
The point is debatable ...." E. P. Krauss, Unchecked Powers: The Supreme Court and
Law, 75 MARQ.L.REV. 797, 836 (1992).
Administrative
4

Northern States Power Co. v. Bugher, 525 N.W.2d 723 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994)
(sustaining an agency of a charitable contribution deduction for state tax purposes).
'Liability Investigative Fund Effort, Inc., v. Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting
Association of Massachusetts, 569 N.E.2d 797 (Mass. 1991), (Commissioner of Insurance has
primary jurisdiction over the physician consumer protection law to the extent in which the
physician requested relief of malpractice rate-making complaints). See also Chemical
Specialties Manufacturers Association v. Jorling, 626 N.Y.S.2d 1; 649 N.E.2d 1145 (N.Y.
1995), (Department of Environmental Conservation can ban the sale, use and distribution of
DEE). 6Newlin Corp. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 579 A.2d 996 (Pa. Commw.

1990), appeal denied, 588 A.2d 915 (Pa. 1991), takings claim waived because the claimants
failed to raise constitutional objections before the administrative agency). See also Nodell Inv.
Corp. v. City of Glendale, 254 N.W.2d 310 (Wis. 1977), (property owners had to exhaust
administrative remedies because the board of appeals had the power to invalidate the allegedly
unconstitutional conditions attached to granting building and occupancy permits even though
the board lacked the power to invalidate zoning legislation).
7Horrell v. Department of Administration, 861 P.2d 1194 (Colo. 1993), (previously
replacing state-employed custodians by contracted services allowed the custodians claimants
to petition for judicial review without the need to exhaust administrative remedies).
8
Beeman v. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 666 A.2d 1314 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App.9 1995), (forcible administration of antipsychotic medicine).
Desilets v. Clearview Regional Board of Education, 647 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1994),
(excluding a junior high student's review of R-rated movies from the school newspaper may
violate his First Amendment rights, depending on the administrative agency's findings).
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authority is to be used. Constitutional issues were divided into three
categories and the Court granted jurisdiction to administrative agencies
for two of three categories. This newly-created subject matter
jurisdiction is concurrent with the court's power so as to ensure judicial
review. Other state courts have also tended toward the same path, but
few have so completely and comprehensively addressed the issues.
Richardson'sFacts andProceduralHistory
Harold Richardson owned and operated the Budget Dental
Laboratory and Madison Dental Center in Nashville, Tennessee.' °
Richardson lacked a dentistry license from the State of Tennessee."
The State Board of Dentistry served Richardson with a Notice of
Charges proposing a civil penalty of $38,500 for owning a dental
practice and practicing dentistry without a license. 2 Richardson sought
a declaratory order presenting three constitutional challenges.
Richardson's first questioned whether the Board, as part of the
Executive Branch, could hear a case that carried a potential criminal
penalty, asserting a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. "
He also raised a due process question through a 'void for vagueness'
argument. Finally, Richardson questioned the Board's authority to
assess a substantial penalty without a jury trial. In addition to these
constitutional claims, Richardson asserted that the Board lacked

l°Richardson, 913 S.W.2d at 450. Richardson was charged with violating T.C.A.
§63-5-107 (which declares that it is unlawful for any person to practice dentistry without a
state license). Richardson v. Tennessee Board of Dentistry, No. 01-A-01-9405-CH00207,
1994 WL 590032, at *7 (Tenn. App. 1994). Richardson was also charged with violating
T.C.A. §63-5-121 (which mandates that dental practices be owned by a dentist licensed to
practice in Tennessee). Richardson, 913 S.W.2d at 450 n. 1
1lid.
12
The Board sought the maximum fine of $500 per day for owning a dental practice
for a fifty-seven day consecutive period and the maximum fine of $1,000 for each of the ten
times Richardson practiced dentistry. While Richardson owned and operated these facilities
since 1986, the charges were for violations that occurred between March 15, 1990 and June 8,
1990. Id
111d at 451. Richardson added an additional constitutional challenge in his second
appeal to the Chancery Court based on Fifth Amendment grounds. Richardson asserted that
because this violation could carry a criminal penalty, he should not have to comply with the
State's Request for Admissions based on his right against self-incrimination.
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jurisdiction to punish an unlicensed private citizen.' 4
The Board refused to consider Richardson's constitutional
challenges to either the statute itself or to the statute's application."
Instead, the Board framed the issue as whether the statute applied to
Richardson. 6 The Board found that the statute' applied to both
licensed persons, as well as those who are required to be licensed, and
held that the Board had the authority to impose civil penalties."
Richardson appealed the administrative law judge's rulings to
the Chancery Court. 9 Richardson argued that the Board lacked the
authority to conduct a case that may become a criminal proceeding, and
the Board could not provide the constitutional protections permitted to
a criminal defendant.2 ° Because this case carried a potential criminal
penalty, Richardson asserted that the Board lacked jurisdiction. The
Chancery Court rejected both arguments and affirmed the Board's

4

1d. at 451. Richardson argued that T.C.A. § 63-1-134 was not applicable to him
because he is not a person required to be licensed by the Board. Furthermore, because he does
not hold a license, the Board of Dentistry has no jurisdiction over him. Richardson v.
Tennessee Board of Dentistry, No. 01-A-01-9405-CH00207, 1994 WL 590032, at * 2.
15Richardson, 913 S.W.2d at 450. After considering Richardson's petition, an
administrative law judge ruled that the Board could not hear arguments on the constitutionality
of the statute or the constitutionality of its application.
161I at 451.
7
Richardson was charged with violating two statues: T.C.A. §§ 63-5-107 and 63-5121. The Board held that: " (1) The Board has no jurisdiction to consider federal or state
constitutional challenges to application of [T.C.A.] § 63-1-134. (2) [T.C.A.] § 63-1-134
applies to persons who are required to be licensed by the board to practice dentistry regardless
of whether they apply for a license. (3) Therefore, if the State proves the allegation against
Richardson described in findings of fact 2, civil penalties can be imposed." Richardson v.
Tennessee Board of Dentistry, No. 01 -A-01-9405-CH00207, 1994 WL 590032, at * 1.
8
The administrative law judge noted that the Board was not assuming concurrent
jurisdiction with the criminal court because the Board was only considering a civil penalty over
which the Board has jurisdiction. See State ex reL Town of South Carthage v. Barrett, 840
S.W.2d 895 (Tenn. 1992). (Statute granting jurisdiction over state crimes to un-elected judges
held unconstitutional). Richardson v. Tennessee Board of Dentistry, No. 01-A-01-9405CH00207, 1994 WL 590032, at * 3. While the Tennessee General Assembly punished
violations of the Dental Practice Act with criminal and civil penalties, the State had elected to
pursue only a civil penalty in this case. Id. at * 2-3.
1gichardson, 913 S.W.2d at 451. Richardson appealed through a judicial review
of a 'final' agency declaratory order. Id. at 461 n.13.
2
°Kichardson v. Tennessee Board of Dentistry, No. 01-A-01-9405-CH00207, 1994
WL 590032, at *4, (quoting the Chancery Court's order of February 1, 1994).
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order.2 Richardson appealed to the Court of Appeals of Tennessee.
The Court of Appeals Opinion
The court of appeals found that the nine constitutional issues
now raised by Richardson coram nonjudice and therefore, void.' Only
those issues resolved by the Board could be considered in the Chancery
Court. Because the Board did not address the constitutional issues
raised by Richardson, the Chancery Court could neither review,
consider nor decide these issues.' The only valid judgment was that
the statute did apply to unlicensed persons.2
. However, the invalid judgment of the Chancery Court preserved
Richardson's constitutional issues in his petition for review which were
then addressed by the appellate court.25 The appellate court held that
the because this violation was also considered a crime, and because the
Board had no jurisdiction to determine guilt or innocence, the
application of this statute was unconstitutional.26 The court reversed
and vacated the actions of the Board and the judgment of the Chancery
Court."7
The Supreme Court of Tennessee's Opinion
The Supreme Court on appeal considered whether the
"Chancery Court is authorized under the Uniform Administrative
Procedures Act to resolve constitutional issues not addressed in the

21

1d. In affirming the administrative law judge's order, the Chancery Court noted that
"In an earlier interlocutory proceeding... [Richardson] sought relief from a declaratory order
of the Board which held that he could be assessed these 'civil penalties'. In that appeal, [he]
made the same arguments he has made in this appeal[.] ... T]his Court concluded that this was
not a criminal
22 prosecution and it has not yet changed its mind." Id. at *4.
Supra note 20 at *6.
23The appellate court relied on the narrow and statutorily mandated scope of
review
of the record before the Board citing DePriest v. Puett, 669 S.W.2d 669 (Tenn. App. 1984),
Id at *5-6; and T.C.A. § 4-5-322(g) (courts are confined to the record made by the agency).
Id at*4.
26d.
25Id
26Id at *7.
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administrative order .... "28 The Court described two methods under
Tennessee's Administrative Procedure Act ("TAPA") for securing
judicial determination of constitutional issues: either immediate judicial
review in the Chancery Court of any non-final Board's rulings; or a
request for a declaratory judgment by the Chancery Court on the legal
validity of a statute, agency rule, or order.29 The Court recognized that
neither immediate judicial review nor a declaratory judgment under the
TAPA require constitutional challenges to be raised at the agency
level.30
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment and
remanded the case to the Board of Dentistry to assess Richardson's
penalties.3
While the opinion of the Supreme Court in Richardsonruled on
six issues, the holdings concerning the authority of administrative
agencies to consider as-applied and procedural constitutional challenges
have the most far-reaching effects for Tennessee Agencies. The Court
recognized that contested cases may involve more than one facet of
constitutionality by allowing an agency to use its authority to address
'as-applied' and agency rule or procedural constitutional challenges.
In particular, the Court held: (1) challenges to the facial
constitutionality of a statute may not be determined by an
administrative agency; (2) constitutional challenges to the application
of a statute to a case may be resolved by an administrative agency; (3)
an administrative agency may address the constitutionality of an agency
procedure or rule; (4) while a party may challenge the constitutionality
of a statute or an agency procedure or rule at the agency level, the
party's failure to do so does not preclude the party from raising issues
upon judicial review; (5) the constitutional issues raised in
Richardson's petition before the Chancery Court precluded further
constitutional consideration on the initial challenges and was a final
judgment; and (6) because the statute of limitations for potential
criminal charges had expired, the privilege against self-incrimination
did not protect Richardson in circumstances that would impose only
28
Richardson,
29

Id. at 457-8.

3°Id.
at 458.
31
Id.

913 S.W.2d at 451.
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civil penalties.
FacialConstitutionalChallenges.
Richardson held that facial challenges to a statute's
constitutionality cannot be resolved by an administrative law judge in
a contested case. This holding echoes not only precedent in Tennessee,
but precedent in the majority of other states and the federal courts.32
Agencies have been urged to consider facial challenges in order to
provide a complete record for judicial review, or to allow for efficient

resolution of cases, or to educate the ALJ on how constitutional
protections interact with the nature of the agency's functions. Despite
these arguments, there exists a traditional and solid boundary between
judicial and administrative authority in dealing with facial challenges.33
This boundary holds an explicit prohibition on the authority of an
administrative agency to declare a statute unconstitutional.

In Richardson,the court was explicit, "T]he legislature may not
32

Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (Trials de novo are required for
'jurisdictional facts' presented to an administrative agency hearing). See also Johnson v.
Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); and Ryan v.
Bentsen, 12 F.3d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1993)( Ryan excused from exhausting administrative remedies
because it would be futile to ask an agency to rule a statute they administer unconstitutional).
The Ryan Court cites Supreme Court cases which support this decision. However, the court
required Ryan exhaust his administrative remedies due to the expedited appeal process SSA
provided to determine if exhaustion would be futile. See also State v. Superior Court, 524 P.2d
1281 (Cal. 1974), note 9 supra.
33
Agencies lack the power to hold statutory provisions unconstitutional. 2 KENNETH
CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J.PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TRETISE §

15.5 at 331(3d ed.

1994). The Supreme Court has stated that adjudicating the constitutionality of congressional
statutes is ordinarily beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies. Johnson v. Robison,
415 U.S. 361 (1974).

See also Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); "Constitutional questions
obviously are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing procedures and,

therefore, access to courts is essential to the decision of such questions.. ." Califano,
430 U.S. at 109 (1977). But see a later comment by the Court on the issue ofjudicial
review: "The extent to which legislatures may commit to an administrative body the

unreviewable authority to make determinations implicating fundamental rights is a
difficult question of constitutional law." Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Institution v.

Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 451 (1985)(holding that Massachusetts's Constitution did not
require judicial review of an agency's decision to revoke good-time credits for
prisoners).
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confer upon an agency the power to determine the constitutionality of
a statute, nor may an agency assume that power. That power rests with
the judiciary. '" The limit on an agency's authority is demarcated by

the constitutional requirements of open access to the courts and a right
to justice." This traditional prohibition is supported in the federal arena
by the limitations of Article III of the U.S. Constitution and by the
nondelegation doctrine implicit in Article I, and as well by due process
considerations.36
Agency actions are further limited by the underlying premise
that agencies have the duty to assume the constitutionality of statutes
they enforce.37 The alternative rule would confer a responsibility that
an agency is not elected to make and a duty that only courts customarily
exercise.3" The presumptive validity of statutes precludes an ALJ from
34913 S.W. 2d at 454-55. (Citations omitted).
35Don's Sod Co. v. Department of Revenue, 661 So. 2d 896 (Fla. App. 5th Dist.
1995), (holding that administrative proceedings did not satisfy the constitutional requirements
of open access to the courts because the taxpayer had to pay the tax before challenging his tax
assessment.
36
See Note, The Authority of Administrative Agencies to Consider the
Constitutionality
ofStatutes, 90 Harv. L.Rev. 1682, 1686-91(1977).
37
",[Wlherea rule or regulation of a public administrative agency is within the scope

of the authority of such agency it is considered prima facie, or presumptively, valid and
reasonable, and the one who raises the question has the burden of pleading and proving facts
showing the invalidity of such rule or regulation. "Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679, 692
(Ky. 1994). See also Central Power and Light Co. v. Sharp, 919 S.W. 2d 485 (Tex. App. 5th
Dist., 1996) (error denied, 1997 WL 126855 (Tex. Mar. 21, 1998). The CentralPower Court
noted; "lIThe legislature has delegated to the Comptroller the power to adopt rules for the
enforcement and collection of the franchise tax .... This delegation of power is particularly
appropriate where.., the legislature itself cannot practically and efficiently exercise the power
it has delegated." 919 W. 2d at 492.
3
Compare, See, Administrative Office of the Illinois Supreme Court v. State, and
Union Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Union, Local 726 (Ill. 1995)(separation of powers
doctrine enjoins the state board for the Public Labor Relations Act from exercising
administrative authority over Supreme Court employees). See also Silverman v. Berkson, 661
A.2d 1266, (N.J. 1995) cert. Denied, 116 St. Ct. 476 (1995) (holding that the state's Bureau
of Securities may subpoena a nonresident and a state court may enforce this subpoena after
reviewing due process considerations). "courts play a critical role in [the] administrative
process. . .judicial involvement ensures administrative due process, . . clarifies the rights
arising from specific disputes in matters concerning both the general public and the individual
involved, ...
[and] aid an administrative... body in the performance of duties legally
imposed on it." Silverman, 661 A.2d at 1273. Cf McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control
Bd., 777 P.2d 91 (Cal. 1989), (administrative agencies have wide discretion in selecting the
means to fulfill duties the legislation has delegated to agencies, including determining
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case.3 9
addressing the facial constitutionality of a statute in a contested
Additionally, because agencies usually initiate hearings in contested
cases, (as the Tennessee Board did with Richardson), this presumption
supports an agency's inclination to uphold a statute.
As Applied Challenges
What is progressive in the Richardson opinion is the Court's
grant of initial subject matter jurisdiction to administrative agencies,
concurrent with the courts, for 'as applied' challenges and
constitutional challenges to an agency's procedure. Allowing an
agency to "resolve questions of the unconstitutional application of a
statute to the specific circumstances of [a] case '' o allows the agency to
correct drafting errors or alter an unconstitutional exercise of a statute's
effects.
The court indicated that since an unconstitutional rule was an
unconstitutional application of an otherwise constitutional statute a
challenge to a rule was cognizable by the agency. After it found that
this approach complied with The Tennessee APA as well as judicial
precedents, 4 ' the Court recognized the agency's authority to resolve
these issues subject to judicial review.4"

restitution and assigning damages but not treble damages because such damages risk
arbitrariness inherent in any scheme of administrative adjudication.). McHugh, 777 P.2d at
107, 111. 39
Courts operate under the presumption that all statutes
are constitutional and
reasonable doubts are resolved in favor of its constitutionality. See State v. Philipps, 521
N.W.2d 913, 914-15 (Neb. 1994) (the burden is on the claimant to clearly establish that a

statute, enforced by an administrative agency, is unconstitutional before a court may declare
United States v. Caroline Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
a statute void);
40
Richardson, 913 S.W.2d at 455.
41Richardson, 913 S.W.2d at 455. Richardson cited two Tennessee Supreme Court
cases: L. L. Bean, Inc. V. Bracey, 817 S.W.2d 292 (Tenn. 1991)(holding that administrative
agencies have the authority to consider the constitutionality of whether a sales tax statute
applied to catalog sales); and Crawford v. Tennessee Consolidated Retirement System, 732
S.W.2d 292, 297 (Tenn. App.) perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 1987)(primary jurisdiction
doctrine supports giving the agency first crack at the constitutional issue, hence the reviewing
agency expertise.)
court benefits
42 from
Richardson, 913 S.W.2d at 455.
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ProceduralChallenges.
Richardson similarly recognized the agency's power to address
arguments. Its procedures were constitutionally deficient.43 While
Richardson's discussion of the point is brief, it's logic is forceful, for
it recognizes the value of immediate attention to an alleged problem
with agency procedure. If there is a procedural problem, the agency
can correct it.
Most Other CourtsAgree FacialChallenges OrdinarilyAre
Beyond Agency Competence
California flirted briefly with permitting agencies to reach facial
challenges, but pulled back. In Southern Pacific TransportationCo.
v. Public Utilities Commission "" the California Supreme Court
assigned to administrative officials the responsibility of obeying and
applying constitutional principles in the face of a contradictory law.
The California Supreme Court noted that the wide grant of power given
by the State Constitution and statutes to the public utilities commission
trust the agency to honor the Constitution.4
In light of the
commission's responsibilities, claimants were required to present all
issues, including constitutional issues, to the commission.46
However, by constitutional referendum California quickly
rejected this broad holding.47 Iowa agreed with the thrust of the
California courts decision, for it recognized the value of a developed
agency record for facial challenges in court. The Iowa Supreme Court
observed that "facial constitutional issues are more effectively

43913 S.W.2d 455.
44556 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1976).

However, the decision in Southern Pacific was
effectively overruled by constitutional amendment that required judicial action prior to an

agency declaring a statute unenforceable, or refusing to enforce because of federal prohibitions.
Reese v. Kiser
760 P.2d 495, 498 n.6 (Cal. 1988).
45
Southern Pacific, 556 P.2d at 292.
46
The California Supreme Court suggested that the traditional prohibition of an
agency from considering constitutional issues would allow school boards operating under
separate-but-equal statutes to ignore the decision of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (19541. Southern Pacific, 556 P.2d at 290 n.2.
Reese v. Kizer, 760 P.2d 495, 498 n.6 (Cal. 1988).
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presented for adjudication based upon a specific factual record," made
before an AU. 8
The general rule that agencies cannot rule on the
constitutionality of a statute they must enforce is a tradition honored by
the Richardson Court. Richardson requires a de novo judicial review
in court for facial challenges and allows a de novo court review to the
constitutional application of a statute to the facts of a case or the
constitutionality of rules or procedures employed by an agency. This
aspect of the Court's holding is quite traditional and shared by the
majority of courts today.
Exhaustion Requirements
While Tennessee has chosen to divide constitutional challenges
into three categories depending on the nature of the claim asserted in a
contested case, other states look at other factors, partiacularly on
exhaustion of administrative remedies. For example, the Michigan
Appellate Court decision found an agency's order reasonable, but
questioned whether the agency's order when reaching a constitutional
challenge precluded the necessity of exhausting administrative
remedies.49 The New York Appellate Division determined that an
administrative remedy could be granted by an agency, and required
The Arkansas Supreme
exhaustion prior to resort to the courts.5"
Court demanded that the constitutional challenge be an essential, non-

48Shell Oil Co. V. Bair, 417 N.W.2d 425, 429-30 (Iowa 1987) (noting that an
agency's consideration of facial challenges is an efficient and effective means of compiling a
record). For an example from another State, see also Newlin Corp. V. Dept. Of Envtl.
Resources, 579 A.2d 996 (Pa.Commw. Ct. 1990) (holding a takings constitutional challenge

the claimant failed to raise the takings issue before the agency)
waived because
49
Consumers Power Co. v. Association of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equity, 518
N.W.2d 514 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) appeal denied sub nom., Association of Businesses Serv.
AdvocatinATariff Equity v. Michigan Pub. Comm'n., 530 N.W.2d 750 (Mich. 1995).

"Constitutional claims that hinge upon factual issues reviewable at the
administrative level must first be addressed so that a necessary factual record can be
established. Mere assertion that a constitutional right is involved will not excuse failure to
pursue established administrative remedies that can provide the requested relief." Corcella v.
Seifert, 181 A.2d 677, 678 (N.Y.App. Div. 2d 1992). See also Matter of Perrotta v. City of
New York, 107 A.2d 320, affid 489 N.E.2d 255 (N.Y.App. Div. 2d 1985)( exhaustion
required when agency might provide relief).
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incidental element of the case before excusing the requirement of
exhausting administrative remedies." The Colorado Supreme Court
questioned whether agency expertise is necessary or relevant before
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies if the contested case
involved more than one claimant. 2 In considering a case with one
claimant, the New Jersey Supreme Court found a First Amendment
constitutional challenge fell within the administrative agency's
jurisdiction and expertise.5"
The Nebraska Supreme Court prefers to determine whether
potential constitutional issues are legislative or quasi-judicial before
subjecting agency decisions to judicial review.'
California courts, however, will review agency rulings on a de
novo basis if 'fundamental vested rights' are at stake. 5 The California
51 "[A]n administrative agency is vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine
some incidental questions of law, and while that agency receives great deference from judicial
forums in its areas of exclusive jurisdiction, issues based solely on constitutional claims are not
within the agency's jurisdiction." Lincoln v. Arkansas Public Service Commission, 854 S.W.2d
330, 332 (Ark.
1993).
2
Horrell v. Department of Administration, 861 P.2d 1194 (Colo. 1993)(en
bancXstate employees did not have to exhaust administrative remedies when challenging state
statues on constitutional grounds because no factual disputes were not involved). An agency
can, however, evaluate whether an otherwise constitutional statute has been applied in a
unconstitutional manner to a particular person, but this case involved a group of persons,
former state custodians. Id. at 1198 n.4.
53
The Supreme Court noted that administrative agencies are clearly empowered to
determine agency issues despite the fact that constitutional claims were implicated. Desilets
v. Clearview Regional Board of Education, 137 N.J. 585, 647 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1994)(finding
the Commission of Education the most appropriate forum to determine if restrictions on a
student's First Amendment rights effectuated a legitimate educational goal).
4Slack Nursing Home v. Department of Social Services, 528 N.W.2d 285 (Neb.
1995)(Holding that the agency's use of salary surveys for a nursing home's administrative
salary expenses fell properly within the agency's authority). The Court concluded that:
Although courts have no jurisdiction to review wholly legislative acts, some agency
determinations possess quasi-judicial characteristics and are appealable. Therefore, the
character of a particular function as quasi-judicial or legislative in nature is an essential factor
in determining the scope ofjudicial power and the extent to which a court may, with or without
express authorization, review action of an administrative agency. Slack Nursing Home, 528
N.W.2d at 294. The Slack Court cautioned that this definition could be difficult to determine:
"[we have not heretofore attempted to define precisely the line between the judicial function
and power55and the legislative one. Probably we cannot do so." Id at 295.
"Fundamental vested rights" are determined by the economic impact of an agency's
decision on the claimant and the character and nature of the individual right affected by
agency's decision. If a fundamental and basic right of an individual is affected by an agency
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Supreme Court did not specifically address if a constitutional issue
were present, yet constitutional challenges were implicitly recognized
and assigned a level of review which allows administrative agencies the
authority to address some constitutional issues. 6
Federal courts have also recognized that administrative agencies
do, and sometimes must, address constitutional issues if these questions
fall within their jurisdiction.57 If an agency's findings on a
constitutional challenge can contribute to the record, exhaustion may
be required by a court.5
A number of federal courts have also addressed similar
concerns. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit questioned
whether the claimant affected a 'public right' in assigning the agency
authority to resolve a case in the face of a Seventh Amendment jury
trial claim.59 The D.C. Circuit considered the Social Security's
decision, the ALJ's ruling will be reviewed under an independent judgment test in which the
trial court makes its own findings of fact from the evidence in administrative record. For a
discussion of this test and a comparison with the substantial evidence test used in California,
see Michael Asimow, The Scope ofJudicialReview ofDecisions of CaliforniaAdministrative

Agencies, 42 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1157 (1995).
56The California Supreme Court described one approach to constitutional review as
"[t]he view of our sister states has the advantage of avoiding meaningless wooden distinctions.
between 'quasi-judicial' and "judicial' powers [their] decisions forthrightly recognize that
administrative agencies do indeed exercise 'judicial-like' powers, and accept the need for broad
administrative powers in our increasingly complex government." McHugh v. Santa Monica
Rent Control Bd., 777 P.2d 91, 107 (Cal. 1989).
57
Riggin v. Office of Senate Fair Employment Practices, 61 F.3d 1563, 1569 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 773 (1996) (the hearing board of the Office of Senate Fair
Employment Practices has clear jurisdiction over constitutional challenge to a statute's
mandator 58retirement provisions for officers of the Capitol Police force).
See 2

KENNETH CULp DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

§ 15.5 at 331-33 (4d ed. 1994) "When the nature of the constitutional question
suggests that agency fact-finding or expertise are likely to provide significant aid to a court in
resolving constitutional questions, the court requires exhaustion." Id. For a description on
the constitutional takings challenge facing environmental agencies see Johnthan S. Klavens,

TREATISE,

At the Edge of Environmental Adjudication: An Administrative Takings Variance, 18 Harv.

Envtl. L.Rev. 277, 279 (1995). The author discusses Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992), to demonstrate how agencies should be allowed to adjudicate a takings
claim to save parties years of protracted litigation and save the state from the escalating
damages that may be eventually awarded to a claimant. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
59
See Simpson v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 29 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1994)(holding
that an agency's decision to require a Savings & Loan officer of a failed S&L to pay
restitution, an equitable remedy that enforced the "public rights" in the S&L's financial
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expedited appeal process enough of a benefit to warrant exhaustion for
a constitutional issue. 60
Other States
While Richardson relies exclusively on Tennessee precedents,
other state and federal courts have found that agencies can, and in some
instances, must, rule on the constitutionality of a statute applied in a
particular case. The Maryland Supreme Court has held that
constitutional claims requiring fact-finding must be addressed at the
agency level before any judicial review can be conducted.6 ' In a similar
vein, the California Supreme Court has held that an agency holds the
power to make an initial determination on a takings challenge and this
power must be used in order to properly exhaust the administrative
remedies before beginning a judicial review.62
There are cases where, because a constitutional argument is
offered, agencies retreat from offering any ruling. In these situations,
a court may demand that an agency consider the 'as-applied'
constitutional challenge so that the judicial review process can proceed
on a possible statutory basis without the necessity of resorting to
constitutional issues. 63 Alternatively, an agency may consider an assecurity, properly
falling within the agency's jurisdiction).
60

Ryan v. Bentsen, 12 F.3d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1993)(holding that the need for

exhausting administrative remedies would facilitate the constitutional question presented
because the Social Security Administration provided an adequate internal process for
addressin constitutional issues.).

Insurance Commissioner v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 664 A.2d 862 (Md.
1995)(Insurance Commissioner must rule on whether the insurance code permitting actuarial
justified gender-based rating differences conflicts with the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment
prohibitinE sex discrimination).
o2State v. Superior Court, 524 P.2d 1281(Cal. 1974)(en banc)(noting that while facial
challenges can be brought at any time, the application of the statute to the facts of a case is
essentially seeking to review the validity of an administrative action properly brought before

the South Coast Regional Commission in seeking a building permit). Review of an agency
order simply determines if the final agency order is valid. To determine the validity of an
agency order, 'as-applied' constitutional challenges must be addressed by the Commission
before judicial
review commences. 524 P.2d at 1289.
63
See Employment Department v. Vitko, 134 Or. App. 641, 896 P.2d 611 (Or. Ct.
App. 1995)(remanding a case back to an agency because of the agency's refusal to hear any

constitutional arguments resulted in a claim where 'an explicit statement of the facts[]... the
principles of law which control[,] . . . and the rational relationship between the facts and
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applied challenge that results in an implicit facial constitutional ruling.
An agency ruling on an as-applied challenge may illuminate the
constitutional defects of a statute invalidating the statute in the
particular application before the agency. In the course of considering
a case, the facial validity of a statute must be considered even if not
specifically addressed by the agency. This consideration may result in
an agency refusing to rule on an issue." The thin line that separates an
as-applied challenge from a facial challenge may result in a case that is
precluded from judicial review.65 The Richardson Court allows for
judicial review in cases falling on either side of this line.
In other cases, it is not a matter of the agency refusing to rule on
a case involving constitutional issues but rather the claimant who
refuses to bring a constitutional issue before the agency. A claimant's
refusal can be based on a desire to avoid futile pursuits because of the
agency's lack ofjurisdiction over constitutional issues.' In other cases,
conclusions.. ." were missing from the record resulting in the absence of a possible statutory
base forjudicial review). Id. at 613.
"The differences between facial challenges and 'as-applied' challenges can be subtle
and subject to disagreement even upon judicial review. In one case, the majority of the
Supreme Court of Colorado found a facial challenge when previously state-employed
custodians asserted that the State Personnel Board violated the Civil Service Amendment to
the Colorado Constitution by replacing the custodians with contract services. The Court
reversed the summary judgment for the State Personnel Board because this was a facial
challenge in which the custodians did not have to exhaust administrative remedies. Three
judges dissented, finding this an as-applied challenge rather than a facial challenge. In the
dissent, J.Mullarkey criticized the court's holding because," [The] characterization of the
employees' claims as purely facial challenges is erroneous and unduly restricts the Board's
constitutional and statutory authority to handle personnel disputes." Horrell v. Department of
861 P.2d 1194, 1201 (Colo. 1993).
Administration.
65
The thin line between facial challenges and as-applied challenges has been
recognized by courts. A federal court used Professor Davis's treatise to describe one facet of
this distinction: A fundamental distinction must be recognized between constitutional
applicability of legislation to particular facts and constitutionality of the legislation. Whena
tribunal passes upon constitutional applicability, it is carrying out the legislative intent, either
express or implied or presumed. When a tribunal passes upon the constitutionality of the
legislation, the question is whether it shall take action which runs counter to the legislative
intent. We commit to administrative agencies the power to determine constitutionality of
legislation.
6Republic Industries Inc. v. Central Pa. Teamsters Pension Fund, 693 F.2d 290, 295
(3rd Cir. 1982) (citing 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS ADMINIsTRATVE LAW TREATISE § 20.04 at 74
(1958)). See e.g., Globe Glass & Mirror Co. v. Brown, 888 F.Supp. 768 (E.D.La. 1995)(a
federal plaintiff does not have to exhaust administrative and state court remedies to bring a suit
under the a federal civil rights statute because plaintiff recognized that his constitutional
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the claimant may not have raised certain constitutional challenges
before the AUL.67
In some states, a claimant's failure to raise a constitutional issue
at the agency level precludes judicial review.68 These states assign
primary exclusive jurisdiction to the agency requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies before judicial review commences. Res
judicata principles or the doctrine of claim preclusion may also result
in forfeiting a constitutional claim not raised in earlier litigation.6 9
Other states, like Tennessee, allow for judicial review of any issue that
may involve a constitutional question with both the agency and a court
having concurrent initial subject matter jurisdiction.70

challenges to a state's unfair trade practice act could not be addressed by a state insurance
commissioner).
67
Richardson presented a second additional constitutional argument based on Fifth
Amendment grounds only to the court rather than to the Board of Dentistry. Richardson, 913
S.W.2d at 68
452.
See e.g. Farm Bureau Town and Country Insurance Company of Missouri v.
Angoff, 909 S.W.2d 348, (Mo. 1995)(an insurer was required to exhaust all administrative
remedies despite the fact that the insurer's facial claim challenged the constitutionality of a
redlining statute). See also Hickey v. North Dakota Department of Health and Consolidated
Laboratories, 536 N.W.2d 370 (N. D. 1995)(issues not raised before an agency will not be
considered for the first time on appeal and consequently, the claimant failed to properly
preserve due
69 process issue for judicial review).
See e.g. Northern States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541, 525 N.W.2d 723
(Wis. 1995)( constitutional challenge barred because claimant had had a fair opportunity to
present this argument during earlier administrative hearings and judicial review). Board of
Education of South-Western City Schools v. Kinney, 494 N.E.2d 1109, 1111 (Ohio, 1986) (as
applied challenge is required to be raised in administrative agency).
7
°See e.g. Griffiths v. City of Ashland, (Ky. App. 1995) Board of Education of
South-Western City Schools v. Kinney, 494 N.E. 2d 1109, 1111 (Ohio, 1986) (as applied
challenge required to be raised in administrative agency). 920 S.W. 2d 78("Our system of
jurisprudence does not require one to exhaust administrative remedies, much less endure lower
court prosecution when the constitutionality of an ordinance is in question.") Id at 79. See
also Grounds v. Tolar Indep. Sch. Dist., 707 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Tex. 1986)(exhaustion not
required if issue is question of law); Compare Consumers Power Co. v. Association of
Businesses Advocating TariffEquity, 518 N.W.2d 514 (Mich. App. 1994) appeal deniedsub
nom., Association of Businesses Serv. Advocating Tariff Equity v. Michigan Pub. Comm'n.,
530 N.W.2d 750 (Mich. 1995)(no further factual development was necessary to consider
constitutional questions, failure to raise in circuit court did not preclude appellate court
considering constitutional claim); Universal Am-Can Ltd. v. Kelly, 197 Mich. App. 34, 494
N.W.2d 787 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993)(appeal denied, 505 N.W. 2d 587 (Mich. 1993) a
commerce clause challenge did not require exhausting administrative remedies).
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Impact
The Richardson Court delineates three areas where
constitutional issues may arise, and dictates the authority agencies hold
in each of these areas. With judicial review assured in each of these
areas, judicial reviews of the agency's record and the doctrine of
exhausting administrative remedies are affected by the Court's holding
that constitutional issues do not have to be raised at the agency level.
The agency must determine the nature of the exact constitutional
challenge raised,7 for a claimant may have to wait until judicial review
for certain constitutional issues. Moreover, a claimant may sometimes
raise constitutional challenges for the first time in court.
Tennessee's approach in allowing constitutional issues to be
raised for the first time in court makes sense. Richardson describes the
practical advantages of allowing claimants to raise constitutional
challenges at the time judicial review commences.' The inherent
processes of an administrative agency presents obstacles in consistently
assuring claimants a "full and fair" hearing.73 A variety of agencies
employing diverse procedures may not offer consistent constitutional
protections.7 4 Because of the informality of some procedures or the
lack of an ALJ's legal training in constitutional issues, judicial review
is kept broad enough to assure access for a constitutional issue raised
at any time. This eases the burden on the claimant who does not risk
71There are examples where an 'as-applied' constitutional challenge results in an

implicit facial constitutional ruling. See e.g. Tracy v. State, 655 N.E.2d 1232, 1237 n.8 (Ind.
App. 1995)(claim to a DEA administrative forfeiture implicitly challenges the forfeiture statute
(concurring dissenting opinion statute); Celebrity Custom Builders v. Industrial Claim Appeals
Office of the State of Colorado, 916 P.2d 539, 541 (Colo. App. 1995)(ALJ's ruling that
ERISA's definition of 'wages' preempted the state's definition of 'wages' implicitly
determined that the state statute was unconstitutional and was not within the ALJ's authority).
Two First Amendment cases underscore the necessity in determining facts in order to reach a
possible constitutional question. See, Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S.
563(1968)(where the Court examined the record to assure that a teacher's statements were
truthful and therefore protected by the First Amendment); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,
190 (1964) (independent constitutional judgment of facts required of supreme court of
whether allegedly obscene material constitutionally protected).
72Richardson, 913 S.W.2d at 457.
73
1d.
74Id.
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losing the ability to raise a constitutional issue by res judicata
principles, collateral estoppel or the doctrine of claim preclusion.
Moreover, adverse decisions may be challenged on constitutional
grounds by an attorney hired after all administrative remedies are
exhausted, saving the expense of hiring attorneys for administrative
hearings.
The broad scope ofjudicial review presented in Richardsonalso
recognizes the unequal positions usually occupied by a claimant and an
agency. Claimants focus on contesting an agency decision rather than
protecting constitutional rights. Agencies focus on enforcing
legislation which may have created the agency and maintains its work.
Because the Constitution is not a prime focus in a contested case,
neither party considers, nor may know if constitutional rights are at
stake until after an agency's ruling.7" The juxtaposition of an
unsophisticated claimant, (possibly without the benefit of an attorney),
confronting an experienced ALJ, proficient in the specialized work of
the agency, offers compelling reasons to ensure the widest possible
judicial review.
However, because the Richardson Court does not require
constitutional challenges to be addressed by an agency, this concept of
fairness comes at a price of judicial efficiency. The necessity of
obtaining administrative rulings to 'as applied' and procedural
constitutional challenges rests on policy considerations concerning the
integrity of the agency adjudication system. To allow an agency to rule
on these challenges promotes the use of agency expertise, preserves a
complete record in the event of a judicial review, and assures judicial
efficiency by avoiding unnecessary adjudication of constitutional
challenges.76 In some cases, a thorough agency review facilitates a
possible ensuing judicial review." Thorough agency reviews also
75Richardson noted this possibility. 913 S.W.2d at 458.
76 "Objection at the agency level will allow incorrect procedures to be eliminated
thereby saving time and expense for the parties." Richardson, 913 S.W.2d at 457.
7See e.g. Relay Improvement Association v. Sycamore Realty Co. Inc. 661 A. 2d
182 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) aft'd, 684 A.2d 1331 (Md. 1996)(owner's failure to seek
release of property from rezoning development precluded a constitutionally based zoning
estoppel defense). The Relay Improvement Court insisted that if an agency's factual findings
are inadequate the necessary facts may not be supplied by the parties and the courts will not
scour the record in search of evidence to support the agency's conclusion. 661 A.2d 188.
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provide a complete record allowing claimants a understandable ruling
that can be challenged in the courts."8
Recognition that administrative agencies can address
constitutional issues implicitly grants an ALJ increased authority.
While this grant of increased authority may appear to create a conflict
of interest in a typical agency examiner, 9 central panel system such as
in Tennessee assures some greater degree of impartiality. 0 By
requiring agency reviews for 'as-applied' and procedural constitutional
challenges, Tennessee can fully utilize the benefits of a central panel
system
Conclusion
The Richardson opinion does not abandon all traditional
constraints on ALJ constitutional 'competence' but it certainly ushers
in a notable change for Tennessee's administrative agencies. The
decision recognizes that administrative agencies must exercise judicial78

3ee e.g. Bader v. Board of Education of the Lansingburgh Central School District,

627 N.Y.S.2d 858, 860 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)(agencies must address constitutional issues
to enable the claimant to understand the ruling in order to make an intelligent challenge
adequate for judicial review).
,9'Thefact that agency employers are often named litigants or interested parties in
the proceedings [administrative law judges] conduct, prevents full public confidence in the
impartiality and the fairness of those proceedings." Victor W. Palmer, The Evolving Role of
Administrative Law Judges, 19 New Eng. L.Rev. 755, 798 (1984).
"The federal judge is, after all, the personification of the judicial branch of the
government: a robed authority figure who can demand and receive respect and obeisance even
from presidents... ALJ's on the other hand, in spite of being called judges and functioning
as such, are subject to doubts about their independence due in part to their employment status
as agency personnel." Jeffrey S. Lubbers, FederalAdministrative Law Judges: A Focus on
Our Invisible Judiciary,33 Admin. L.Rev. 109, 110 (1981).
[1]t would seem clear that courts should scrutinize agency deliberations with great
care, granting little, if any deference and generally hindering agency efforts to promulgate
rules. This is because administrative agencies, like legislatures, are subject to substantial
interest group influence. In order to prevent agency capture by special interest groups, the
judiciary should subject agency action to rationality review and rigorous mean-ends analysis.
Jonathan R. Macey, SeparatedPowers and Positive PoliticalTheory: The Tug of War Over
AdministrativeAgencies, 80 Geo. L.J. 671, 675 (1992).
1°T.C.A.§ 4-5-321 (1991). (Administrative Procedural Division). Some critics charge
that independence may not be fully realized because these ALJ's also serve within agencies.
Criticism of the central panel system also notes that ALJ's may lack the specialization intraagency AL's hold.
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like' power to reflect the need for broad administrative power to be
exercised to ensure complex government works. With broad judicial
review allowed, this power can be exercised within the clear guidelines
offered by the Richardson opinion, confined by a Constitution
interpreted by the courts. A traditional prohibition has changed; the
Richardson opinion clarifies how much it has changed.

